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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the course of the past ten or more years, community leaders have engaged in
considerable debate regarding the future of Northeast Ohio’s air service capabilities.  No
one has questioned the importance of providing superior air transportation in and out of
the Northeast Ohio market; in fact, quite the opposite is true.  Leaders are in strong
agreement that air service is critical to the continued economic growth of this area.
They are not in agreement, however, as to how that service  can best be delivered.  While
the cities of Brook Park and Cleveland have come to an agreement on the expansion of
Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, ongoing discussions continue regarding the
development of a new regional airport, possibly at the largely abandoned Ravenna
Arsenal property.  It is clear to me, however, that the best course of action is one that has
not yet been discussed.  The solution to volume constraints lies in maximizing existing air
service capacity and in making incremental investments that improve the competitive
position of all Northeast Ohio’s airports.
I have drawn this conclusion for a number of reasons.  First, members of the corporate
community continue to express concern about the ability of even an expanded Cleveland
Hopkins Airport to handle the region’s future air travel demands.  To achieve major airport
status, Hopkins will have to increase its current volume of just over 11 million passengers
per year by more than 8 million passengers—an increase of 72 per cent.  Since Greater
Cleveland itself cannot generate such a boost in numbers, most of this increase will have
to come from passengers transferring from flights that are generated through expanded
hub activities.  Regardless of the source, however, Cleveland Hopkins—eve  after its
planned expansion—will be incapable of handling the increased volume.
Secondly, the creation of a new regional airport s no  feasible for five important reasons:
· The federal government indicated that Denver was the last new airport that will receive
substantial funding.  The burden of cost, therefore, would fall to Northeast Ohio and
the state of Ohio.
 
· The fiscal opportunity cost would be tremendous—easily reaching into the billions of
dollars.  Additional infrastructure investments for adjacent roads, water, and sewers
would also be needed.  These alone would consume much of the region’s typical
share of the state capital budget for a significant period of time.
 
· Financing a new airport with user fees is not possible.  Airlines will not absorb the cost
through substantially increased landing fees, and they will not impose passenger fees.
 
· Placing a major growth pole at the edges of the region would significantly distort
current growth paths, feed suburban sprawl, and have a devastating impact on land
values.
 
· Self-interest on the part of Summit and Cuyahoga counties (as well as their
municipalities) dictates that they oppose a new outlying airport in order to protect their
tax bases.
The solution to expanding the capacity of air service in Northeast Ohio lies in finding a
regional answer to capacity constraints by developing coordinated niches for several of
the region’s airports.
While Northeast Ohio cannot afford a new regional airport, t also cannot afford to allow
Hopkins to reach capacity after the new investments are completed.  If that capacity is
reached, fares will increase, the number of destinations will stagnate, and the competitive
position of the region will erode when compared to Cincinnati, Detro t, Pittsburgh, and
possibly Columbus and Nashville.  Existing air facilities in the region must be crafted into—
and operate as—a regional system, with Hopkins at its hub and Akron-Cant  Regional
Airport serving as the source of additional capacity.
Following this course of action would demand both vision and regional leadership.  No
region in the United States has attempted to knit a coordinated system of airports as a
strategy for dealing with capacity constraints at a single airport.  Northeast Ohio should
pave the way in what is an inevitable national response to dwindling federal resources and
increasing air service capacity constraints.
The most difficult aspects of this process will be tackling the issues of the governance and
ownership of the facilities.  Community leaders in Akron, Canton, and Cleveland must
confront the challenge of forming a regional alliance to ensure the competitive position of
this vital portion of our economic infrastructure.  The keys to beginning this process are to
make known information about the current capacity of each airport in the regional system,
collectively identify the goals for the region’s air service, and determine if the region’s air
service goals are realistic when matched to those of our partners in this enterprise—the
airlines themselves.  Only when a cooperative, regional approach to Northeast Ohio’s air
service needs is undertaken can a workable, long-term solution be implemented.
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THE FUTURE OF NORTHEAST OHIO’S AIRPORTS:
FRAMING THE COMING DEBATE*
In early June of 1997, the cities of Brook Parkand Cleveland reached a settlement over land
uses around Cleveland-Hopkins Airport, and  the city councils of both communities approved
the deal a few weeks later.1  This allows Continental Airlines to construct a regional jet facility
and the airport authority to extend and expand its runway system, pending various federal
approvals.  Yet, this agreement and the expansion of Cleveland-Hopkins Airport do not end
the discussion about the future of air services in Northeast Ohio.  There is concern on the
part of some members of the corporate community about the ability of the expanded
Cleveland-Hopkins Airport to handle the region’s air travel demands in the future, after the
expansion is completed.2  This discussion is complemented with suggestions that the largely
abandoned Ravenna Arsenal be developed into a new regional airport. Meanwhile, federal
funds were committed to help convert Youngstown’  airport into a regional cargo facility that
can handle wide-bodied aircraft and compete with Rickenbacker Airport in Columbus.  There
is also discussion about expanding the air cargo capacity at Lorain County’s airport.
What is missing from this melange of actions, investments, and proposals is an analytical
framework that sets the stage for a discussion of the region’s development options based
on an understanding of the air services markets in North America.  Is the air services
market important to the region’s development?  What is Northeast Ohio’s position in the
North American market?  What additional information is required to analyze alternative
development proposals?  What does the region need to accomplish to move into the next
tier of competitors?
                                           
* I thank the committee of Leadership Cleveland’s 1997 Regional Development Day for asking me to make the
presentation on which this paper is based.  Ken Silliman provided the airport data and gave me access to the
details of the land use agreement reached between Cleveland and Brook Park.  I also thank the W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research for making their analysis of the air cargo market available to me.
1 The Economic Benefits of the Cleveland-Brook Park Settlement Agreement, City of Cleveland, May 23,1997.
2 David R. Wasserstrom summarized the expansion plans for Hopkins Airport and the arguments in favor and
against the establishment of a new regional airport, and described Denver’s experience with its new airport in
“Come Fly With Me,” Cleveland Magazine, Inside Business, May 1997, pp.22-27.
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Two assumptions underlie this paper:
· Discussions about the future of air services in Northeast Ohio must be based on an
understanding of the structure of the North American air services market and Northeast
Ohio’s place in that market.
 
· The air services market is regional.  Therefore, analysis of policies and potential
investments relating to air services must be based upon a regional perspective.  For
this paper, data on individual airports within metropolitan areas were aggregated into
regional air markets.  For example, rather than discussing each of New York’s or
Washington’s three airports, the data for all airports in each metropolitan area are
aggregated and used as the units of analysis.  What is important is each region’s air
services capacity—the capacity of its system of airports, not the capacity of individual
airports in that system.
 
Data are available for only two airports in Northeast Ohio, Cleveland-Hopkins and Burke
Lakefront.3  Therefore, the analysis incorporates only those two airports.  However,
planning for the future of air services in Northeast Ohio must include a seemingly
underutilized resource—the Akron-Canton Regional Airport.
AIR SERVICES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Air services have two functions in a region’s economic development.    First, it is an
industry in its own right—generating wealth, income, and employment opportunities, and
that industry is growing nationally.  Second, it is part of the economic infrastructure
required to maintain Northeast Ohio’s position as an economic command and control
center in the global economy, and it allows regional producers to be better integrated in the
international economy.  There are two travel-cost considerations that are important to
                                           
3 The first table in the Appendix lists all of the airports in North America for which data were available in the
May 1997 North American Air Traffic Report and explains how they were combined into regional air markets.
Twelve markets had data available for more than one airport.  Air traffic out of the Akron-Canton Regional
Airport is so low that data were not reported in these reports.  Additionally, the Federal Aviation Administration
publishes annual data on enplanements for each airport in the US.  The most current data are for 1995.  These
show Cleveland Hopkins Airport as the 32nd busiest with 5,270,000 enplanements—these are passengers who
got on  an airplane, and Akron-Canton Regional Airport in 158th place with 212,665. (Report VP, “Primary
Airport Enplanement Activity Summary for CY1995 Listed by Rank Order, Enplanements,” Federal Aviation
Administration’s web site: www.faa.gov/arp/vp.htm)
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business:  the amount of time it takes to travel to a wide variety of destinations (market
access) and the cost of airfares (the cost of that access).  Secondary, but still an important
concern to the regional economy, is the role that air travel plays in the region’s visitor
destination industry, which also involves both access and cost considerations.
The air services market offers a trade-off for mid-sized population centers such as
Northeast Ohio:  Increasing the number of destinations served means that demand must
be concentrated on a single carrier.  This allows the carrier sufficient volume to operate a
hub and spoke system that generates a larger number of destinations.  However, there is a
cost in having one dominant airline in a market: As a carrier’s market share increases, so
does the amount of money that the carrier can charge for tickets on either monopoly or
near-monopoly routes.  (Interviews suggest that prices begin to escalate when a carrier
controls about 70 percent of the passenger business at an airport.)  Improving access to
destinations comes at the expense of higher ticket prices, unless the market has sufficient
local demand that the carrier needs the market more than the market needs the carrier.
Components of the Air Services Market
There are three components of the market for air services: local demand, transfers, and
visitors.4
· Local demand consists of passenger origins and destinations from the local market—
those who live in Northeast Ohio or are visiting people or businesses in the region—as
well as  air freight that originates (or is destined for) locations in or near Northeast Ohio.
 
· Transfers are people and freight that change planes or modes of transportation in the
region, but their ultimate destination is elsewhere.  There are two separate types of
transfer operations in the air services market:  domestic hubs and international
gateways.  Large coastal cities have an advantage over smaller, inland airports in
attracting international flights because they are closer to international destinations and
                                                                                                                                 
4 These categories have not been used to analyze the flow of air customers, but they are a useful way of
thinking about the composition of demand and the opportunities that exist for expanding demand.
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have significant volumes of passengers and freight generated by their local markets.5
Inland hubs can compete for international traffic only if they offer substantially cheaper
operating costs than coastal airports, have access to a national route system, and can
support demand for multiple international flights to cover the fixed costs of the
international service.  The complicating competitive factor for inland airports is that the
size of the metropolitan areas that serve as the primary international gateways—New
York; Chicago; Los Angeles; Washington, DC; and San Francisco, dictates that airlines
offer them direct international service, giving the airline a base on which to leverage
their other international passengers.  Smaller inland markets—with the exception of
Detroit and Toronto—cannot offer the airlines this captive passenger base.  The
advantage of inland locations will improve only if coastal airports either experience
capacity constraints, or if the cost of their operations becomes too high (here the cost is
more than monetary cost to the airlines and includes congestion costs—delays in
takeoffs and landings times, theft, and passenger inconvenience).
 
· Visitor demand consists of travelers who are primarily visiting attractions or attending
meetings in the region. (There is some overlap between tourism and local demand in
terms of visitors who are attending business meetings in the region.)
Providing air services is a volume business typified by high fixed costs and significantly
lower marginal or incremental costs (i.e., the actual cost of operating a flight).  Therefore,
air carriers concentrate their capital and route structures around places where they can
maximize passenger flow—trading volume against per- passenger operating costs.
Regions that have large populations have a built-in advantage because of the numbers of
people and businesses located there.  Airlines want to serve those markets, generating
competition; and if their profit margins get too high, the markets have enough volume to
attract new competitors.  Other regions have the advantage of being major tourist
destinations and generating volumes through their attractions; this is true for Las Vegas
and Orlando.  Again, these volumes generate competition and a large variety of carriers.
                                           
5 This is a classic break-in-bulk locational consideration and the reason for interest in airports.  Economic
activity concentrates where shipments must be broken down and when the mode of transportation changes.  It
makes no difference if the cargo is freight or people.  That is the reason why metropolitan areas with good
international air connections tend to garner a disproportionate share of international businesses; the executives
do not have to change planes to reach their destinations and waiting time is minimized.
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Washington, DC, and Salt Lake City benefit from having business activities that generate a
large number of trips—in Washington’s case, the generator is the federal government and
in Salt Lake’s case, it is the Mormon Church coupled with outdoor recreation.
If the region wants to expand the number of destinations served by its airports, but does
not have either a sufficiently large population base or large enough volumes generated by
visitors to attract multiple carriers flying to a wide variety of destinations, then it can
compete for the hub operations of a major carrier.  At this point, passenger volumes,
weather, operating conditions, and operating costs determine the competitive position of
the regional market against other places.  What is Cleveland’s position in the North
American air market?
Northeast Ohio’s Position in the North American Air Services Market
There are several ways to show where Northeast Ohio is positioned in the hierarchy of
regional air services markets in North America.  The Cleveland-Akron Cons lidated Metropolitan
Area (CMSA), consisting of eight counties, is the 16th largest market in North America as
measured by population.  The CMSA is also the 15th largest market in the U.S. in terms of total
metropolitan income—the region has total income of $72.1 billion.6 (Table 1)  The CMSA has the
18th highest per capita income in the U.S.  However, the effective market for air services may be
about half again as large as the CMSA in terms of population.  The extreme northeastern edge
of the state of Ohio splits its origin and destination business between Pittsburgh and Cleveland,
with most of the Youngstown area traffic heading into Pittsburgh.  The southern border of
Cleveland’s market is halfway to Columbus, and the western edge is somewhere to the east of
Toledo.  The City of Cleveland’s airport consultants define the service area for Hopkins Airport
as a 16- county region with 4.1 million residents, and they define Pittsburgh’s market as just the
Pittsburgh Metropolitan Area (MSA).7  Notwithstanding the size of Northeast Ohio’s passenger
catchment area, the May 1997 North American Air Traffic Report ranked Cleveland Hopkins
Airport 32nd in passenger volume among all North American airports and 30th
                                                                                                                                 
6 The eight counties are: Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, Geauga, Lake, Lorain, Medina, Portage, and Summit.
7 Communication between Leigh Fisher Associates and the City of Cleveland on a draft of this paper, no date.
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Table 1: Characteristics of the 50 Largest North American Air
Service Markets
Population Total Metro Total Metro Per Capita
Metropolitan North American Income Income 1995 Income 1995
Area Rank 1995 US Rank $ millions US Rank 1995
New York-NJ-CT-PA 1 19,732,748 1 619,024 1 31,370
L.A.-Long Beach-Riverside 2 15,362,165 2 357,571 33 23,276
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha 3 8,589,913 3 234,889 7 27,345
Washington DC-Baltimore 4 7,107,116 4 204,023 4 28,707
S.F.-Oakland-San Jose 5 6,539,602 5 201,544 2 30,819
Philadelphia-PA-NJ 6 5,967,323 7 160,677 8 26,926
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence 7 5,768,968 6 164,718 5 28,552
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint 8 5,279,500 8 140,163 9 26,549
Dallas-Fort Worth 9 4,449,875 9 113,633 14 25,536
Toronto 10 4,344,000 * * * *
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria 11 4,164,393 10 104,073 17 24,991
Miami-Ft.Lauderdale 12 3,443,501 13 80,095 34 23,260
Atlanta 13 3,431,983 11 87,956 11 25,628
Montreal 14 3,337,000 * * * *
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton 15 3,265,139 12 85,826 10 26,286
Cleveland-Akron 16 2,903,808 15 72,102 18 24,830
Minneapolis-St. Paul 17 2,723,137 14 74,901 6 27,505
Denver-Boulder-Greeley1 18 2,698,972 16 69,021 13 25,573
San Diego 19 2,644,132 18 61,106 35 23,110
Phoenix-Mesa 20 2,563,582 19 58,036 38 22,639
St. Louis 21 2,547,686 17 63,929 16 25,093
Pittsburgh 22 2,394,702 20 57,518 25 24,019
Tampa-St. Petersburg 23 2,180,484 21 49,391 37 22,651
Portland-Salem OR, WA 24 2,021,982 22 48,170 26 23,823
Cincinnati-Hamilton 25 1,907,438 23 45,310 27 23,754
Vancouver 26 1,831,000 * * * *
Kansas City 27 1,663,453 25 41,123 19 24,721
Milwaukee-Racine 28 1,640,831 24 42,025 12 25,612
Sacramento-Yolo 29 1,604,724 26 37,534 31 23,390
Norfolk-Virginia Beach 30 1,540,446 30 31,217 43 20,265
Indianapolis 31 1,476,865 27 36,402 21 24,648
San Antonio 32 1,460,809 33 29,313 45 20,066
Columbus, OH 33 1,437,512 28 34,614 23 24,079
Orlando 34 1,390,574 32 29,645 42 21,319
New Orleans 35 1,315,294 34 28,089 41 21,356
Charlotte 36 1,289,177 31 30,989 24 24,038
Salt Lake City, UT 37 1,199,323 42 23,739 46 19,794
Buffalo 38 1,184,052 36 26,766 39 22,605
Las Vegas 39 1,138,758 39 26,198 36 23,006
Greensboro-Winston-Salem 40 1,123,840 38 26,357 30 23,453
Hartford 41 1,115,223 29 32,169 3 28,845
Nashville 42 1,093,836 35 27,453 15 25,098
Rochester, NY 43 1,088,516 37 26,703 22 24,532
Memphis 44 1,068,891 40 25,222 28 23,596
Ottawa-Hull 45 1,022,000 * * * *
Oklahoma City 46 1,015,174 46 20,474 44 20,168
Austin-San Marcos 47 999,936 45 22,338 40 22,339
Grand Rapids 48 997,895 43 23,232 32 23,281
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill 49 995,256 41 24,596 20 24,713
Louisville 50 987,102 44 23,232 29 23,536
* Income data were not found for Canadian metropolitan areas.
1 Data for Denver CMSAs and Colorado Springs MSA were added to correspond to definition of air market.
Sources: US population data were found at www.census.gov/population. Metropolitan area income data were found at www.bea.doc.gov/remd2
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among all air services markets (the difference is that some air services markets have
multiple airports with scheduled passenger service).  In addition, the two Cleveland airports
were 34th in cargo volume and 22nd in terms of flight operations when the ranking is done
by air markets.8
The City of Cleveland’s airport consultants, Leigh Fisher Associates, ompared passenger
volumes at Cleveland Hopkins to those at Pittsburgh’s airport.9,10 Hopkins handles about
11.5 million passengers a year, while Pittsburgh’s passenger volumeis about 20.5 million.
Despite its lower overall passenger volumes, Hopkins has more local origin and destination
traffic than does Pittsburgh, 8.5 million passengers per year compared to 6.0 million.  The
reason why local traffic accounts for nearly three-quarters of Hopkins’ passengers and only
30 percent of Pittsburgh’s lies with the scale of the hub operations at each airport and the
role that each airport plays in its hub airline’s national route structure.  The same would be
true if Hopkins is compared with its two other major regional competitor airports, Cincinnati
and Detroit.
At first glance the region is grossly under-performing when compared to the size of the
market.  However, what these gross comparisons miss is the segments of the air services
market where Northeast Ohio is competitive.  Northeast Ohio’s airports can never be a
competitor of New York, Chicago, or Washington.  To understand the potential of the
system of airports in Northeast Ohio, a strategic framework is required.  This framework
reveals Northeast Ohio’s competitor locations and the volumes required for it to become a
viable competitor to air markets with greater volumes of traffic.
                                           
8 Appendix Table 1 lists the major air services markets in North America and notes those with multiple airports
that ranked among the 80 busiest, either in terms of passenger operations, cargo volume, or take-offs and
landings.  Appendix Table 2 lists the 80 busiest air markets by passenger volume, while Appendix Table 3 lists
the 114 busiest airports by passenger volume.
9 Leigh Fisher Associates, op cit.
10 Data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shows that Akron-Canton Regional Airport enplaned an
additional 213,000 passengers in 1995; not all of these enplanements need be on scheduled air service.  If as
many people got off of airplanes at Akron-Canton as got on them, then the airport serviced nearly 500,000
passengers in 1995 (Report V2, “U.S. Airport Enplanement Activity Summary for CY 1995 Listed by State and
Rank Order Within State,” Federal Aviation Administration’s web site: www.faa.gov/arp/v2.htm)
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THE AIR SERVICES HIERARCHY: SEVEN TYPES OF AIR MARKETS
Regions and their airports have different niches in the North American air services market
based on the types of services provided and the scale of their operations.  Examining data
on hub locations, total passenger and freight volumes, and the scale of transoceanic
operations reveals seven segments to this market.11   Six share a hierarchical relationship.
(The one niche that does not relate to the others is cargo.  Cargo specialists are air
markets with modest passenger volumes coupled with large volumes of air freight.)
Regions that are further up the hierarchy provide all of the services available at regions on
lower rungs and, in addition, provide qualitatively different services.
Following are the six types of air markets that form the hierarchy (from lowest to highest):
· Local air services markets are the vast majority of air markets.  The volume of traffic in
these markets is dictated by local origins and destinations.
 
· Destination air markets contain major tourist or convention destinations that supplement
locally generated demand, and they do not have major hub operations.  This means
that passenger volumes are greater than would be expected based on the population
size and total income of the region.
 
· Regional hubs are air markets where a single airline transfers a large volume of
passengers between flights in a hub and spoke fashion.  The majority of the flights are
to destinations in that section of the nation with high volumes of flights to cities located
further up the hierarchy.  The larger regional hubs will have a limited number of
transoceanic flights, usually operated by the hub airline.  As the scope of the hub
operation increases, so does the market share of the hub airline.
 
· National hubs are air markets where a single airline has a dominant hub and spoke
operation that generates larger volumes of customers than do the regional hubs.
                                           
11 The definitions and terminology used to segment air services markets in this paper does not conform to that used by the air
services industry, the FAA, and airlines because it is based on the concept of air services market rather than airport.  The typology
could be refined if data on local origins and destinations were available as well as information on the percentage share of
passengers in an airport that are flown on the airline with the largest market share.
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These domestic flight operations are coupled with limited international operations.  The
airline’s headquarters are often located in these cities.
 
· International gateways are air markets most often located on a coast with a high
volume of international flights.  The largest of the international gateways are not
dominated by a single airline.  Major domestic airlines have relatively large operations
at these gateways to feed international and local passengers into their domestic route
systems.
 
· Pinnacle air markets are at the top of the hierarchy.  They combine the functions of all
of the other types of air markets, coupling very high volumes of domestic and
international passengers with large freight operations.
The aviation industry uses a different set of terms to categorize airports.12  The largest
difference is that my classification is based on the air services market while the industry
bases its typology on airports.  The industry’s base designations are rigin and destination
airports and include markets that I classify as local air services markets and destination
markets (thereby lumping together Orlando  Las Vegas with Hartford).  The industry
defines regional hubs as airports that contain a hub operation that is not the airline’s
primary hub.  No distinction is made based on the overall scale of operations in the air
services market.  A group of airports are called “m ga” hubs, fortress hubs, or primary
hubs—all refer to the same airports.  These airports have more than 300 daily jet
departures and are the central connecting point for “major” airlines.  This category includes
air services markets that I have categorized as regional hubs, national hubs, and pinnacle
air markets.  The industry has a separate category for international gateways but allows
overlaps with pinnacle and national air services markets so that an airport may carry two
designations.   The industry recognizes two types of cargo hubs, national sort facilities and
regional air/truck distribution facilities (where more tonnage is shipped by truck than by air).
                                           
12 Leigh Fisher Associates, op cit.
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Table 2 lists air services markets according to where they are on the hierarchy.  Data on
each air services market’s passenger and freight volumes in 1996 and their rank on these
two data elements are also presented in the table.  Each of the segments of the air
services hierarchy is mapped and discussed in the following pages, with the exception of
the regional air services markets, moving from the top of the hierarchy to the bottom.  The
maps are accompanied by tables that list the passenger and freight volumes for each
region in 1996 and their passenger and cargo ranking among all of the air markets in North
America.
Pinnacle Air Markets: New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles
Three regions sit at the top of the hierarchy of air markets: New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles.  These three pinnacle markets incorporate all of the aspects of those air markets
that are lower on the hierarchy and have substantially higher freight and passenger
volumes than do any other type of air market; additionally they dominate the market for
transoceanic business.  The three New York airports have the largest volumes of both
passengers, at nearly 81 million each year, and freight, transporting 2.7 million metric tons
of goods.  Chicago’s three airports ranked second in passenger volume, with 79 million
people, and seventh in cargo.  Los Angeles was third in passenger volume and fourth in
cargo.  Each market is contested by several airlines, even if a specific airport in that market
has a dominant airline.  Neither New York nor Los Angeles is considered to be the national
hub of any specific airline, and all major airlines have a presence in these two markets.
United Airlines’ headquarters and largest center of operations is at Chicago’s O’Hare
Airport, but it faces strong rivals in American Airlines’ O’Hare operations and the airlines
based at Midway Airport, which specializes in low-fare domestic carriers.  Several of the
major domestic airlines are present in the pinnacle markets and have substantial
operations, and these markets service a disproportionate share of international air traffic.
Table 3 lists the international passenger volumes for 16 airports in the continental United
States with the largest amounts of international traffic as of 1994.13  New York’s Kennedy
                                           
13 Table 3 differs from the others in this paper because it reports data for airports, not air markets.  Data for New York airport,
presumably Kennedy and Newark airports, are also combined in these tables.  Airports in the other air markets could not be
combined because traffic figures were not available for all of the airports in those markets.
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Table 2:  North American Air Service Markets by Specialization in
1996
Metropolitan Passenger Cargo
Type of Market Region Rank Volume Rank Metric Tons
Pinnacle Air Markets New York* 1 80,962,006  1 2,681,529   
Chicago* 2 79,127,250  7 1,286,962   
Los Angeles* 3 71,229,828  4 1,806,785   
National Hubs Dallas* 4 65,099,018    9 774,947     
Atlanta 5 63,303,171    8 800,181     
International First Tier San Francisco* 6 58,995,828  5 1,418,973   
  Gateways Miami-Ft. Lauderdale*7 44,674,431  3 1,866,437   
Washington DC* 9 41,302,560  13 528,579     
Toronto 19 24,259,268  11 735,486     
Second Tier Boston 16 25,167,741  17 405,582     
Seattle 18 24,324,596  18 388,218     
Third Tier Philadelphia 24 19,317,220  14 493,532     
Vancouver 26 14,201,343  27 216,889     
Portland 29 12,593,013  25 265,083     
Anchorage 49 4,763,283   29 185,119     
Regional Hubs First Tier Houston* 8 42,179,263  21 339,100     
Denver* 10 37,079,485  16 411,394     
Second Tier Detroit 12 30,610,993  22 326,288     
Phoenix 13 30,411,852  24 283,665     
Minneapolis 14 28,771,750  19 361,448     
St. Louis 15 27,274,846  35 131,436     
Third Tier Charlotte 21 21,849,879  30 184,070     
Salt Lake City 22 21,088,478  26 227,913     
Pittsburgh 23 20,533,660  32 156,619     
Cincinnati 25 18,864,206  23 288,823     
Cleveland* 30 11,582,164 34 131,600     
Destination Markets Las Vegas* 11 31,374,749  53 56,747        
Honolulu 17 24,326,737  15 436,165     
Orlando 20 23,587,773  28 206,755     
San Diego 27 13,788,725  45 92,980        
Tampa 28 13,001,091  36 123,439     
Kansas City 31 10,454,857  31 163,217     
Montreal* 33 8,941,883   NA
New Orleans 34 8,483,453   49 78,570        
San Antonio 35 7,135,291   46 87,335        
Nashville 36 7,099,103   55 53,608        
Cargo Specialists Memphis 32 9,922,211   2 1,933,846   
Louisville 53 3,559,340   6 1,368,520   
Indianapolis 38 7,069,039   12 609,450     
Dayton 71 1,977,243   10 767,255     
Toledo 91 600,276     20 344,976     
*  Data are available on more than one airport in this air market.
Source: North American Air Traffic Report, May 1997.
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Figure 1: Pinnacle Markets and National Hubs
NH: Dallas
P: Los Angeles NH: Atlanta
P: Chicago
P: New York
Florida
Metropolitan Passenger Cargo
Type of Market Region Rank Volume Rank Metric Tons
Pinnacle Markets New York 1 80,962,006    1 2,681,529    
Chicago 2 79,127,250    7 1,286,962    
Los Angeles 3 71,229,828    4 1,806,785    
National Hubs Dallas 4 65,099,018    9 774,947      
Atlanta 5 63,303,171    8 800,181      
source: North American Air Traffic Report, May 1997
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Table 3: 15 Highest Volume International Passenger Gateway
Airports in the Continental United States in 19941
Total Percent Change Percent on US
Gateway City Rank Passengers from 1993 Flag Carriers
New York-Newark2 1 19,798,000    5.3 46
   New York 16,317,000    4.7 46
   Newark 3,481,000     8.3 44
Miami 2 12,663,000    2.0 53
Los Angeles 3 12,341,000    6.6 30
Chicago 4 6,069,000     3.0 61
San Francisco 5 4,968,000     15.1 52
Boston3 6 3,189,000     0.9 55
Dallas 7 3,057,000     5.0 85
Houston 8 2,693,000     6.0 68
Atlanta 9 2,692,000     12.6 72
Washington 10 2,589,000     10.6 66
Detroit 11 2,162,000     11.0 84
Orlando 12 1,622,000     0.0 19
Seattle4 13 1,313,000     -2.1 73
Philadelphia 14 1,057,000     2.5 73
Minneapolis 15 1,013,000     8.3 98
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Table 100, Segment Data.
1 A minimum of three carriers must report data before data for the city are disclosed.
2 Data for New York and Newark were added together. 
3 Leigh Fisher Associates indicated that Boston is no longer a major international gateway, 
   Northwest discontinued its international hub operations in 1994. 
4 Leigh Fisher Associates indicated that Seattle is no longer a major international gateway, 
   losing much of its international service to San Francisco and Los Angeles since 1994.
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Airport services the largest volume of international travelers, and adding Newark’s nearly
3.5 million international passengers to it clearly puts New York at the pinnacle of  North
American air services with nearly 20 million passengers per year.  Dividing the 1994
international passenger data in Table 3 by the 1996 total passenger data in Table 2
provides a rough idea of the international specialization of each air market.  Nearly one in
four air travelers in New York is coming from or heading to an international destination.
Miami services the second largest volume of international passengers, but is not
considered to be a pinnacle market due its relatively smaller number of total passengers.
Nearly 25 percent of Miami’s passengers are international, resulting in that region’s being
classified as a top-tier international gateway.  Los Angeles’ 12.3 million international
passengers puts it in third place (about 17 percent of total traffic in the market), followed by
Chicago with 6.0 million international passengers (accounting for 8 percent of passenger
volume).
National Hubs: Dallas and Atlanta
Two regional markets are considered to be the national hubs of airlines: Dallas, American
Airlines’ headquarters city, and Atlanta, the home of Delta.  These two metropolitan areas
have substantial volumes of passengers, but these volumes are markedly lower than those
experienced by the three pinnacle markets.  Atlanta transported 63 million passengers and
Dallas 65 million.  Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport is the seventh busiest
international airport in the United States, with 3.1 million international passengers, and
Atlanta is in ninth place, servicing 2.7 million international passengers.  International
passenger traffic accounts for between 4 and 5 percent of total passenger volume at these
airports.  What distinguishes the international business at these two airports is the large
market share held by U.S. flag carriers, compared to airports with much larger volumes of
international business.  This indicates the importance of the connection between
international passenger flows and the national route structure maintained by the
headquarters airline in these national hub air services markets.
The airline industry considers Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport and Atlanta’s airport to
be “fortress” or “mega” hubs for their dominant airlines, due to both the scale of the hub
airlines’ operations and their market share.  Other airlines could purchase market share at
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these airports only after surviving punishing fare wars, and they could survive only if they
have significantly lower cost structures than those of the hub airlines.  The hub operations
bring a wide variety of direct connections to these local markets and reinforce the
desirability of these two places for national, international, and regional headquarters and
distribution activities.  This access comes at a price, however; and that price is relatively
high fares that come from having a near-monopoly air carrier in the market place.14  Fares
will not decline in Dallas until out-of-state flight restrictions at Love Field are rescinded.
Delta’s high- fare structure out of Atlanta explains why low-fare airlines frequently pop up in
that market.
International Gateways: 3 Tiers With 10 Markets
International gateways are differentiated from national hubs by having significantly more
international flights and, at least for the larger of the international gateway markets, by the
fact that a number of major domestic carriers are viable competitors.  The data indicate that
the international gateways can be split into three tiers based on their volumes and
specializations.  The first tier international gateways are composed of San Francisco;
Miami-Fort Lauderdale; Washington, DC; and Toronto—the regions are ranked by their
total passenger volume.  The U.S. international gateways are ranked sixth through eighth
in passenger volumes; Toronto is ranked 19th.  On its face it is difficult to include Toronto
as a first-tier gateway due to the fact that it only services about 60 percent of the
passengers of the Washington, DC airports, and it is closer to Bostonand Seattle in
passenger activity.  However, it is included with this group because Toronto and Vancouver
handle most of Canada’s transoceanic traffic and Toronto is the international hub of Air
Canada.
Miami-Fort Lauderdale had the second largest number of international passengers in 1994
                                           
14 Steven A. Morrison and Clifford Winston examine airline economics in their article, “The Fare Skies: Air Transportation and Middle
America,” The Brookings Review (Fall, 1997): 42-45. They state that “medium” hubs are more competitive in terms of fares than are
“large” hubs, which in turn are more competitive than small hubs and non-hubs.  They estimate that load factors account for half of
observed differences in fares, aircraft size accounts for an additional 40 percent of the fare difference, and competition accounts for
the remaining 10 percent.  They write: “Medium and large hubs are nearly equally competitive.  But lower load factors and smaller
aircraft at medium hubs should make their fares about 5 percent higher than fares at larger hubs.  In fact, their fares are 4 percent
lower … because of the strong presence of new entrants (airlines) on their routes.” (p.44)  Also see Martin Dressner e  al. “The
Impact of Low-Cost Carriers on Airport and Route Competition,” Jour al of Transportation Economics and Policy 30(3) 1996:309-
328.
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Figure 2: International Gateways
I3: Anchorage
I3: Vancouver
I2: Seatle
I3: Portland
I1: San Francisco
I1: Miami/ Ft. Lau
I1: Washingotn, D.C.
I1: Toronto
I2: Boston
I3: Philadelphia
Florida
Metropolitan Passenger Cargo
Type of Market Region Rank Volume Rank Metric Tons
International First Tier San Francisco 6 58,995,828    5 1,418,973    
  Gateways  Miami-Ft.Lauderdale 7 44,674,431    3 1,866,437    
DC 8 41,302,560    13 528,579      
Toronto 19 24,259,268    11 735,486      
Second Tier Boston 16 25,167,741    17 405,582      
Seattle 18 24,324,596    18 388,218      
Third Tier Philadelphia 24 19,317,220    14 493,532      
Vancouver 26 14,201,343    27 216,889      
Portland 29 12,593,013    25 265,083      
Anchorage 49 4,763,283     29 185,119      
source: North American Air Traffic Report, May 1997
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 (12.7 million) and was the third busiest freight market—reflecting its role as the gateway to
South and Central America.15  The airports in the San Francisco Bay region—San
Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose—transported 59 million total passengers and 1.4 million
tons of freight.  San Francisco International Airport handled nearly 5 million international
passengers (about 8 percent of the market’s passenger load).
Washington, DC’s three airports serviced 41 million passengers and together are an
example of airport specialization within a regional market.  In other words, they form a
system of airports.  National Airport specializes in price-insensitive domestic travel, where
travelers are willing to pay more money to save commuting time into the District.  Dulles
Airport specializes in international travel coupled with United’s secondary domestic hub
operations and business traffic to Northern Virginia.  Baltimore-Washington International
Airport (BWI) combines the price-sensitive tourist trade, the District’s business traffic that is
not time sensitive, and business traffic reaching destinations in Maryland.  BWI has
become the discount fare reliever to the Baltimore and Washington markets.16  Part of this
specialization is due to flight restrictions that Congress and the Federal Aviation
Administration have imposed on National.  Flights into and out of National must be less
than 1,500 miles, forcing longer distance travel to either stop within that perimeter or land
at one of the other airports, and flight operations must end at 11:00 PM.  Additionally,
National is one of four airports that has a limit on the number of take-offs and landings,
known as slot controls, that are used to control congestion.17
The two-second tier international gateways are Boston and Seattle.  Both serve as hubs for
their regions and have about the same level of passenger traffic as does Toronto—all are
near 25 million passengers a year.  In 1994, Boston serviced nearly 3.2 million international
passengers and Seattle recorded 1.3 million.  However, Leigh Fisher Associates, the City
                                           
15 The international passenger data do not differentiate between long- and short-haul international traffic.  Airports near the
Caribbean, Mexico and Canada report high international passenger loads, however significant portions of their business may be
short-haul.   Data for Miami, Dallas, Houston, Detroit, Seattle, and Minneapolis may be distorted by short flights.
16 BWI also handles 30 international flights a day in addition to its 55 domestic flights (“DAP in the Can? Caulking Firm Eyes Move,”
Baltimore Business Journal, September 15, 1997, electronic edition).
17 There are four slot-controlled airports: Chicago O’Hare, New York’s LaGuardia and Kennedy, and National (see Morrison and
Winston, op cit., p.45).  Instead of slot controls they recommend that congestion pricing be used to both control congestion and
increase efficiency.
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of Cleveland’s consultants on airport economics, noted that international passenger traffic
has dropped at both of these airports since 1994.  Northwest closed its international
gateway in Boston in 1994, and Seattle lost market share to San Francisco d L s
Angeles since the 1994 data were collected.18
Toronto is differentiated from the other second-tier international gateways by its volume of
freight shipments.  Toronto shipped nearly three quarters of a million metric tons of freight,
while Seattle and Boston handle about 400,000 metric tons each.19  The third-tier
international gateways are Philadelphia, Vancouver, Portland, Oregon, and Anchorage.
Anchorage is included in this group despite its relatively small passenger volumes,
because the data show that it was the third highest volume international freight airport in
the United States.20
Regional Hubs: 3 Tiers Containing 11 Markets
Regional hubs have two distinguishing characteristics: international flights are secondary to
their primary function as central transfer points in an airline’s domestic route system and
one airline has a dominant market share of the passenger market.  There are three tiers of
regional hubs, parallel to the three tiers of international gateways, each distinguished by
passenger volume.  Houston and Denver share the top tier.  (The Denver market was
formed by adding together the data for Denver and Colorado Springs because it is clear
that the recent increase in Colorado Springs’ traffic was caused by the increase in fares
associated with the new Denver airport.21)  These two air markets have passenger volumes
                                           
18 Leigh Fisher Associates, op cit.
19 The air freight statistics from Canada are a bit odd because freight data are only available for Toronto and Vanc uver.
20 U.S. Department of Transportation , Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Table 100, Segment Data. Anchorage and Fairbanks are
uniquely located on circum-polar air routes between Asia, Russia, North America, and Europe.  In November 1996, the Department
of Transportation granted permission to foreign carriers, with the exception of those from Japan and the U.K., to transfer cargo at
these airports.
21 Denver Airport serviced 32.3 million passengers in 1996 while Colorado Springs served 4.8 million.  Leigh Fisher Associates
asserts that these two airports do not form a system.  The increase at Colorado Springs was due to a low fare start-up airline,
Western Pacific Airline (WestPac), that moved its hub to Denver in June of 1997.  The move increased WestPac’s cost per
passenger from $3 to $15; WestPac increased its fares to cover the cost increase.  This suggests that operations may be less
sensitive to airport costs than I asserted and that airlines will pay more to access higher passenger volumes.  Leigh Fisher
Associates state that airport fees and charges account for about 5 percent of airline costs.  WestPac entered bankruptcy during the
first week of October 1997, and is terminating its Colorado Springs traffic and concentrating its operations on Denver.
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Figure 3: Regional Hubs
RH3: Salt Lake
RH1: Denver
RH2: Phoenix
RH1: Houston
RH2: Minneapolis
RH2: St. LouisRH3: Cincinnati
RH2: Detroit
RH3: Charlotte
RH3: Pittsburgh
Florida
The star marks Cleveland.
Metropolitan Passenger Cargo
Type of Market Region Rank Volume Rank Metric Tons
Regional Hubs First Tier Houston 8 42,179,263    21 339,100      
Denver 10 37,079,485    16 411,394      
Second Tier Detroit 12 30,610,993    22 326,288      
Phoenix 13 30,411,852    24 283,665      
Minneapolis 14 28,771,750    19 361,448      
St Louis 15 27,274,846    35 131,436      
Third Tier Charlotte 21 21,849,879    30 184,070      
Salt Lake City 22 21,088,478    26 227,913      
Pittsburgh 23 20,533,660    32 156,619      
Cincinnati 25 18,864,206    23 288,823      
Cleveland 30 11,582,164    34 131,600     
source: North American Air Traffic Report, May 1997
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that are about ten million people greater than the markets in the tier below them.  Houston
transported 2.7 million international passengers in 1994, a bit more than two-thirds on U.S.
flag airlines, which indicates the importance of Continental to the Houston market.22
The second tier contains the two hubs of Northwest Airlines, Detroit and Minneapolis; the
central hub of troubled TWA, St. Louis; and Phoenix, a region that combines indigenous
traffic with visitor traffic and the hub operations of a regional carrier.  Detroit had the third
largest percentage increase in international traffic from 1993 to 1994, reaching 2.2 million
passengers.  International traffic accounts for about 2 percent of its passenger volume.
Minneapolis carried 1.0 million international passengers, which is  about 1 percent of its
volume, nearly all on U.S. flag carriers.  Again, these data show the importance of being a
hub city if the region is inland and competing for international traffic.  All of these regional
markets handle about 30 million passengers a year and approximately 300,000 metric tons
of freight, with the exception of St. Louis, which has about one-third of the volume of
freight.
Cleveland’s comparable airports are the third-tier regional hubs in Charlotte and Pittsburgh,
maintained by US Airways; and Salt Lake Cityand Cincinnati, Delta’s regional hubs.
Cleveland is by far the smallest regional hub market, handling 11.6 million passengers per
year, compared to Cincinnati’s nearly 19 million and Pittsburgh’s 20 million.  International
traffic is not reported for these markets, indicating that it is a relatively small part of their
business and that the traffic that exists is concentrated on fewer than three carriers.
The strength of each of these regional hubs depends in large part on the strength of the
airline that dominates the market and the position of the hub in the airline’s route system.
The Delta system is centered in Atlanta.  New York’s Kennedy Airport is the focus of
Delta’s international operations, with Salt Lake City and Cincinnati serving secondary roles.
US Airways’ system is a patchwork of strong regional hubs in Charlotte, Pittsburgh, and
Washington, DC, with Philadelphia serving as a limited international gateway.  Continental
has its national hub in Houston, which is also its gateway to Mexico and Central and South
America.  Continental’s European gateway is Newark.  Cleveland is Continental’s
secondary  regional hub.  Northwest is a major regional competitor based in Minneapolis
                                           
22 U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Table 100, Segment Data.
The Urban Center, Levin College of Urban Affairs, CSU 21
and Detroit.  Detroit is the only regional hub in the East North Central states with a strong
international presence.  United and American serve Asia out of Chicago, Northwest serves
Asia out of both Detroit and Minneapolis, and Air Canada serves all of its destinations
outside of North America from Toronto.
Destination Air Markets: 10 Markets
The next tier in the air services hierarchy is composed of destination air markets.  There
are two types of destination air markets.  Many of these metropolitan areas are either major
tourist or convention destinations that when coupled with locally generated demand, result
in larger passenger volumes than would be expected based solely on their population size.
Examples of destination air services markets are Las Vegas, Orl ndo, and New Orleans.23
Kansas City and Montreal are not major tourist or convention destinations but are included
due to the number of passengers that use their airports.
Destination air markets must: (1) not contain either a national or regional hub of a major
carrier, (2) not have unusually large volumes of direct international traffic on regularly
scheduled airlines, and (3) have international travelers that terminate their trips in the
region. It is unlikely that any of these markets are dominated by a single carrier because so
many carriers find serving the destination from their own hubs to be profitable.
Two of the destination air markets, Nashville and Kansas City, could be expanded into
hubs due to their location and the volume of passengers they currently handle.  T e Wall
Street Journal has reported that Nashville, the smallest of the destination markets, appears
to be under development by Southwest Airlines as a hub for transcontinental operations.
Arguing in favor of this development are the facts that Nashville is: (1) a prominent tourist
city, (2) in the midsection of the nation, and (3) a center of an industry that generates a fair
amount of travel—music.  However, arguing against the establishment of Nashville as a
                                           
23 Orlando is a unique air market due to the drawing power of its visitor attractions.  It is the 33rd largest population
center in North America, yet its air market was ranked 20th in total passenger traffic and it was the 12th busiest
international airport in the nation.  However, only 19 percent of Orlando’s international passengers arrived on U.S.
flag airlines, indicating that a good deal of its traffic is on international charter aircraft.
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Figure 4: Destination Markets & Cargo Specialists
D: Las Vegas
D: San Diego
D: San Antonio
D: Kansas City
D: New Orleans
C: Memphis
D: Nashville
C: Louisville
C: Dayton
C: Indianapolis
C: Toledo
D: Orlando
D: Tampa
Florida
Metropolitan Passenger Cargo
Type of Market Region Rank Volume Rank Metric Tons
Destination Markets Las Vegas 11 31,374,749    53 56,747       
Honolulu 17 24,326,737    15 436,165      
Orlando 20 23,587,773    28 206,755      
San Diego 27 13,788,725    45 92,980       
Tampa 28 13,001,091    36 123,439      
Kansas City 31 10,454,857    31 163,217      
Montreal 33 8,941,883     NA
New Orleans 34 8,483,453     49 78,570       
San Antonio 35 7,135,291     46 87,335       
Nashville 36 7,099,103     55 53,608       
Cargo Specialists Memphis 32 9,922,211     2 1,933,846    
Louisville 53 3,559,340     6 1,368,520    
Indianapolis 38 7,069,039     12 609,450      
Dayton 71 1,977,243     10 767,255      
Toledo 91 600,276       20 344,976      
source: North American Air Traffic Report, May 1997
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major hub operation is that: (1) it is a relatively small metropolitan area, (2) Southwest has
done well with a point-to-point route system, and (3) similar claims were made when
Southwest expanded into both Chicago’s Midway Airport and St. Louis.
Kansas City has had a history of being a hub for a number of smaller airlines, but all
eventually entered bankruptcy and disappeared.  Nearly 8.5 million passengers used
Kansas City’s airport without a hub operation, giving it adequate size.  The airport’s
physical plant is reported to be underutilized and it is situated in the middle of the country.
The combination of all these factors makes Kansas City a disciplining device for other
second- and third-tier hub airports in much the same way that empty baseball and football
stadiums are used to extract concessions from cities that have existing professional sports
franchises—it is a credible threat.  While airlines are capital-intensive—airplanes cost a
great deal of money—they are easy to move and air crews often travel great distances to
get to their base airports.  This means that the only forces holding an airline to its current
hub are the length and strength of the airport’s lease agreement with the airline and the
cost of lost goodwill if the airline abandons an existing hub.  While these considerations are
important, airlines have shifted their operations in the past.  Cleveland lost air services
when United centralized its operations in Chicago and a second time when US Air
decreased its Cleveland operations and strengthened Pittsburgh’ .  Cleveland also
benefited when Continental decreased its presence in Denver and increased it in
Cleveland.
Cargo Specialists: 5 Markets
There is growing national interest in expanding air services by using air freight as an
anchor.  There are two components to the argument.  The first examines the growth in
international commerce in manufacturing and distribution.  The argument begins by noting
that international commerce is expanding and firms are increasingly dealing with large
numbers of international and domestic suppliers.  They then assume that with the growth in
just-in-time supply strategies, suppliers are increasingly using air freight to ship their
products and the assemblers will further benefit from locating at an airport so that work-
process inventory will not have to be handled multiple times.  The problem with this logic is
that it does not factor in the cost of air freight.  The second line of argument examines the
growth rates in air freight, especially in the overnight package business, and assumes that
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the growth will attract new firms into the market that will need a site for their operations.
There is a third component that is implicit to these two lines of argument—that air freight
pays its own way.  All of the assumptions behind these three arguments are incorrect.
There are three types of air cargo: air express delivery services, air freight forwarders, and
an activity that has become known as a “tradeport.”  Ai  express delivery services operate
their own hub and spoke freight networks.  They also pick up and deliver individual
packages and cargo in their own truck fleets.  They have established their operations at
airports that (1) do not have major passenger operations, so they will not suffer from
congestion delays, and (2) are centrally located in a band of cities that stretches from
Toledo to Memphis.24  These companies¾FedEx, UPS, Airborne, DHL, and the U.S. Postal
Service¾originally specialized in documents and small packages, but have moved into
larger and heavier goods as fax and e-mail technologies have eaten into their courier
business. (FedEx, for example, bought Flying Tiger, which operates out of Rickenbacker.)
They now compete with Burlington Air Express and Emery, which operate hub and spoke
systems with their own set of planes but have specialized in heavier freight.  Air express
delivery services also compete against freight forwarders who coordinate truck shipments
to airports that can handle wide-bodied aircraft and purchase space for cargo on both all-
freight aircraft and in the bellies of passenger aircraft.  Most of this freight goes to or from
international airports where the space in the bellies of passenger planes is very
competitively priced.  In fact, most of Northeast Ohio’s air freight is not shipped by air,  but
is instead trucked to Toronto, Chicago, Philadelphia, or New York.  It is then air-freighted
from these markets.  The air express companies with sorting operations in Ohio also truck
their cargo to their in-state air hubs. The small number of airports that specialize in air
freight have unique market positions that are not duplicated by other types of airports.
The air markets with the largest volumes of air freight and hose with the greatest
specialization in air freight (specialization is defined as the highest ratios of metric tons of
freight shipped per passenger) are listed in Table 4.  Three of the largest in terms of
absolute tonnage are the pinnacle markets¾New York (1), Los Angeles (4), and Chicago
                                           
24 Memphis is an exception.  Not only is it a prominent freight airport, it is a secondary hub for Northwest Airlines and ervices nearly
10 million passengers a year.
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Table 4: The Largest and Most Specialized Air Freight Markets in
North America
Largest Freight Markets Most Specialized Freight Markets
Metropolitan Metric Tons Metropolitan Passengers per
Rank Region Cargo Rank Region Ton of Cargo
1 New York* 2,681,529     1 Toledo^ 1.7
2 Memphis^ 1,933,846     2 Reading 2.0
3 Miami-Ft. Lauderdale* 1,866,437     3 Dayton^ 2.6
4 Los Angeles* 1,806,785     4 Louisville^ 2.6
5 San Francisco* 1,418,973     5 Memphis^ 5.1
6 Louisville^ 1,368,520     6 Stewart 7.1
7 Chicago* 1,286,962     7 Columbia^ 10.4
8 Atlanta 800,181        8 Indianaplolis^ 11.6
9 Dallas* 774,947        9 Des Moines 16.2
10 Dayton^ 767,255        10 Miami-Ft. Lauderdale* 23.9
11 Toronto 735,486        11 Sioux Falls 24.2
12 Indianapolis^ 609,450        12 Fairbanks 25.1
13 Washington DC* 528,579        13 Anchorage 25.7
14 Philadelphia 493,532        14 Lansing 26.5
15 Honolulu 436,165        15 New York* 30.2
16 Denver* 411,394        16 Greensboro 31.3
17 Boston 405,582        17 Roanoke 32.3
18 Seattle 388,218        18 Richmond 32.6
19 Minneapolis 361,448        19 Huntsville 33.7
20 Toledo^ 344,976        20 Omaha 34.4
21 Houston* 339,100        21 Hartford 35.5
22 Detroit 326,288        22 Wichita 36.4
23 Cincinnati^ 288,823        23 Philadelphia 39.1
24 Phoenix 283,665        24 Los Angeles* 39.4
25 Portland 265,083        25 Toronto 41.5
26 Salt Lake City 227,913        26 Knoxville 41.5
27 Vancouver 216,889        27 San Francisco* 41.6
28 Orlando 206,755        28 Portland 47.5
29 Anchorage 185,119        29 Milwaukee 48.8
30 Charlotte 184,070        30 Buffalo 52.0
31 Kansas City 163,217        31 El Paso 52.2
32 Pittsburgh 156,619        32 Grand Rapids 52.2
33 Hartford 151,532        33 Columbus* 55.2
34 Cleveland* 131,600        34 Honolulu 55.8
35 St Louis 131,436        35 Austin 56.2
36 Tampa 123,439        36 Greenville 57.8
37 Stewart 117,184        37 Hilo, Hawaii 60.5
38 Columbus* 113,673        38 Birmingham 61.3
39 Milwaukee 111,844        39 Chicago* 61.5
40 Des Moines 111,795        40 Boston 62.1
* The metropolitan area has data reported for more than one airport.
^ The air market has a sorting center of an air express delivery company.
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(7); two are the national hubs—Atlanta (8) and Dallas (9); three are first-tier international
gateways—Miami-Fort Lauderdale (3), San Francisco (5), and Toronto (11); and four are
the hubs of package express companies—Memphis (2), Louisville (6), Dayton (10), and
Indianapolis (12).
The air freight business is dominated either by those airports that can land a large volume
of wide-bodied jets (which is largely a byproduct of the international passenger business)
or by the specialized express package companies.25  Six of the ten airports that are most
specialized in air freight are hubs of express package companies, and only one of the ten
most specialized airports handles large numbers of passengers—Miami-Fort Lauderdale.
FedEx developed the overnight express package business at its Memphis air hub, which is
now the second largest air freight market in North America.  They have since opened a
second hub operation in Indianapolis (which is also the national hub of the express mail
service of the U.S. Postal Service) and a number of regional sorting facilities.  In October,
FedEx announced the groundbreaking of a sorting facility in Miami to service its Latin
American business.  FedEx also offers point-to-point service on high-demand routes.  UPS
centered its overnight business in Louisville, with three regional hubs located in Rockford,
Illinois; Columbia, South Carolina; and Ontario, California.  Toledo is the home of
Burlington Air Express.  Dayton is the center of Emery’s operations and Airborne Express
operates its own airport in Wilmington, Ohio.  DHL has a sorting facility in Cincinnati.
These sorting operations generate a large number of part-time jobs late at night, and there
has been limited spin-off business from these hub operations.  The express package
business is an industry that is maturing, and it is unlikely that there will be new entrants
unless one of the current players stumbles badly.
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research surveyed the air freight business as
part of a feasibility study to develop a tradeport in Kalamazoo.26  A tradeport is a
combination industrial park, airport, and free-trade zone.  Proponents of tradeports state
                                           
25 Passenger airlines have been substituting narrow-bodied aircraft for wide-bodied planes, making it impossible for them to ship
containerized freight.  This has increased the amount of truck shipments to international gateway airports from domestic airports.  A
cargo study commissioned by Cleveland Hopkins Airport noted that Hopkins is served by one wide-bodied flight a day to Chicago
and that has taken most of the air freight that is shipped by air, as opposed to the larger amount of air freight that is actually trucked
to an international gateway. Air Cargo Study for Cleveland and Ohio Markets (Baltimore: Sypher:Muller, Inc., no date).
26 Economic and Fiscal Impact of a Proposed International Tradeport at the W.K. Kellogg Regional Airport (Kalamazoo, MI: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, October 6, 1995).
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that the push of just-in-time production in high-valued, globally disbursed industries has
created a market opportunity for these specialized facilities.  The Upjohn Institute found
several problems with this concept—the largest is that none of those they surveyed in 1995
were breaking even.27  The second problem is that the two that were most successful—
Columbus’ Rickenbacker Airport and Alliance Tradeport near Dallas—were succeeding
largely as distribution facilities, not as  production platforms.  Rickenbacker’s “success” is
due to Columbus’ historical strength in distribution, its position on the interstate highway
system, the not-inconsequential influence of The Limited¾which had its distribution located
in Columbus, and the fact that the facility was heavily written down as an orphaned military
air base.  This is a difficult recipe to reproduce.28
The Upjohn report also notes several other challenges to the tradeport concept:
· Tradeports and air freight, while growing at 5 percent annually, are the shipping method
of last resort for businesses, especially manufacturing firms.  To justify air freight, the
goods need to be extremely time sensitive and worth more than $15 per kilo (about 2.2
pounds), and the volumes need to be too large to be delivered by an overnight delivery
service.  The electronics industry is the largest customer of the air freight industry.
· Much of the growth in air freight is attributable to the overnight package business,
which is maturing.  Combining statistics from the overnight package business with more
traditional air freight overstates the growth rate in more traditional air freight.
· To take advantage of an industrial park that is equipped with a major airport implies that
the plant can use air-freighted materials from a single source in airplane-sized loads on
a frequent basis.  This is nearly inconceivable for anything other than distribution, even
if the loads are consolidated from a number of vendors in the same region—such as
the region around Hong Kong.  It would make more sense to consolidate major
                                                                                                                                 
27 Franklin County provides a $3.5 to $4 million subsidy each year to Rickenbacker, Toledo Express Airport runs a $200,000 deficit
that would be larger if not partially offset by passenger traffic, and H. Ross Perot Jr.’s Alliance Tradeport is an impressive monument
to public subsidy.
28 Leigh Fisher Associates noted three tradeports that they judge to be successful.  All are on the Texas-Mexico border and service
maquiladora factories.
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subassemblies offshore or assemble the product completely offshore, and use the U.S.
facility for distribution.
· Standard air freight services and overnight delivery companies can access any part of
the United States within several hours’ drive of a major airport in a fairly economical
fashion, allowing firms to use conventional sites and more economical truck, rail, and
inter-modal transport for the bulk of its needs.
The research team at Upjohn then looked at the possibility of financing a tradeport through
revenues generated by air freight and discovered another set of challenges.   Air freight is
clearly an add-on business for airports—passengers produce much more revenue.
· Air freight does not generate ancillary revenues from parking, auto rental, and
concessions.
· Freight forwarders are extremely price-sensitive.  Airline and truck coverage is so
complete that freight forwarders and consolidators will shift locations quickly if prices
rise relative to alternative locations.  All that users of air freight se vices need is to be
within a four-to-five-hour truck drive of a major airport.  Cleveland has three major
airports within that range—Cleveland Hopkins, Detroit, and Pittsburgh.  In addition,
major air cargo facilities exist in Columbus and Toledo, an  modest investments are
being made to expand Youngstown’s air freight capacity so that it can land wide-bodied
all-freight aircraft.  Also, Willow Run near Detroit has wide-bodied all-freight air service.
A recent survey of the air cargo business at Cleveland-Hopkins Airport indicated that
most international air freight in this market was trucked to New York, Chicago,
Philadelphia, or Toronto.29  This is a competitive business.  (Freight would be less price-
sensitive if the region produced extremely time-sensitive or fragile products such as fish
or flowers, as is true of airport operations in Seattle and Amsterdam.)
In sum, air freight is not the way to build an airport.  The cargo business will grow in
Cleveland hand-in-hand with its international passenger operations because the cargo
                                           
29 Air Cargo Study for Cleveland and Ohio Markets (Baltimore: Sypher:Muller, Inc., no date).
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follows the capacity available in the bellies of passenger planes (providing that either
containers are developed to fit the new generation of narrow-bodied planes or that wide-
bodied planes begin to use Cleveland-Hopkins Airport, which is doubtful).
Regional Air Services Markets
Most regions in North America have airports that are at the bottom of the air services
hierarchy.  These are regional air services markets.  Their level of services are dictated by
the volume of local passenger and freight traffic.  They do not have substantial volumes of
traffic from tourism and are not major transfer points for either passengers or freight. They
vary from air markets that justify jet service and have relatively high volumes of flights,
such as Hartford-Springfield and Milwaukee, to smaller airports that rely primarily on
commuter flights that shuttle passengers into regional hubs, such as Kalamazoo.
Summary
The Northeast Ohio air services market is barely a member of the third tier of air service,
sharing the characteristics of a hub and of a regional air services market.  Our immediate
regional competitors are second- and third-tier regional hubs—Detroit, Pit sburgh, and
Cincinnati—all linked to strong national airlines.  All of these competitor air markets have
international service, giving them an advantage in the location of foreign-owned operations
and North American headquarters activities.  Detroit has a natural advantage for foreign-
headquartered firms in the automobile and automotive parts and supply businesses.  But
Northeast Ohio should be competitive in those industries where our economic base
provides a competitive advantage—such as machinery, steel, and related machined
products, chemicals, paints, and coatings.  The lack of international flights waters down this
advantage.  However, US Airlines, TWA, and, to some extent, Delta h ve shown
weaknesses of late that offer opportunities to Continental Airlines to expand its market
share in the East Central United States air services catchment area.
The economic geography of air services is not solely determined by the size or composition
of the regional market, presence or absence of tourist amenities, or the location of the
market in the continent.  Operating costs are important to a region’s success in providing
air services.  For example, Continental pul ed its secondary hub operation out of Denver
and increased its presence in Cleveland in reaction to a combination of three factors.
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Continental and United Airlines were engaged in a brutal fare war at Denver’s old airport
when commitments needed to be made for the new International Airport.  At that time
United was in a strong financial position and Continental’s fin nces were fragile and could
not sustain the losses in the struggle for market share.  Continental also noted the void
created in Cleveland when United centralized its flights to Chicago in 1979 and the higher
operating costs at the new Denver Airport.  The combination of lower revenues at Denver
due to the fare war, the prospects of higher operating costs at the new airport, and the
higher margins at Cleveland caused Continental to lower its presence in Denver and shift
operations to Cleveland.  Only Continental knows the weight the higher operating costs in
Denver played in their decision, but it did play a role.
The point is that strategic business decisions on the part of individual airlines, their financial
strength, and their ability to market determines the success of an individual airport and air
services market—you win or lose with the company that brought you to the dance.
The figure that follows the hierarchy maps all of the important air markets in the East North
Central portion of North America, running from Toronto in the northeast to Memphis in the
southwest, and from Pittsburgh in the east to St. Louis in the west.  Cleveland is marked by
a star on the map.  P represents a pinnacle market (Chicago).  I1 represents a first-tier
international gateway (Toronto).  RH means regional hub—there are five on this map—and
the number indicates its tier:  Detroit and St. Louis are second-tier regional hubs;
Cincinnati, Pittsburgh and Cleveland are third-tier regional hubs.  Nashville is a destination
market that may emerge as a regional hub.  Finally, there are five cargo specialist hubs in
the region.  Memphis is a cargo specialist and a hub airport.
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Figure 5: Hierarchy of Air Markets
F
ig
u
re
 5
H
ie
r
a
r
c
h
y
 o
f 
A
ir
 M
a
r
k
e
ts
M
e
tr
o
p
o
li
ta
n
M
e
tr
o
p
o
li
ta
n
P
a
s
s
e
n
g
e
r
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
M
a
rk
e
t
R
e
g
io
n
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
M
a
rk
e
t
R
e
g
io
n
R
a
n
k
P
in
n
a
c
le
 M
a
rk
e
ts
N
e
w
 Y
o
rk
*
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
F
ir
s
t
H
o
u
s
to
n
*
8
C
h
ic
a
g
o
*
  
H
u
b
s
 T
ie
r
D
e
n
v
e
r*
1
0
L
o
s
 A
n
g
e
le
s
*
S
e
c
o
n
d
D
e
tr
o
it
1
2
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
H
u
b
s
D
a
ll
a
s
*
 T
ie
r
P
h
o
e
n
ix
1
3
A
tl
a
n
ta
M
in
n
e
a
p
o
li
s
1
4
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
F
ir
s
t
S
a
n
 F
ra
n
c
is
c
o
*
S
t 
L
o
u
is
1
5
  
G
a
te
w
a
y
s
 T
ie
r
 M
ia
m
i/
F
t.
L
a
u
d
*
T
h
ir
d
C
h
a
rl
o
tt
e
2
1
D
C
*
 T
ie
r
S
a
lt
 L
a
k
e
2
2
T
o
ro
n
to
P
it
ts
b
u
rg
h
2
3
S
e
c
o
n
d
B
o
s
to
n
C
in
c
in
n
a
ti
2
5
 T
ie
r
S
e
a
tt
le
C
le
v
e
la
n
d
*
3
0
T
h
ir
d
P
h
il
a
d
e
lp
h
ia
D
e
s
ti
n
a
ti
o
n
 M
a
rk
e
ts
L
a
s
 V
e
g
a
s
*
1
1
 T
ie
r
V
a
n
c
o
u
v
e
r
H
o
n
o
lu
lu
1
7
P
o
rt
la
n
d
O
rl
a
n
d
o
2
0
A
n
c
h
o
ra
g
e
S
a
n
 D
ie
g
o
2
7
C
a
rg
o
 S
p
e
c
ia
li
s
ts
M
e
m
p
h
is
T
a
m
p
a
2
8
L
o
u
is
v
il
le
K
a
n
s
a
s
 C
it
y
3
1
In
d
ia
n
a
p
o
li
s
M
o
n
tr
e
a
l*
3
3
D
a
y
to
n
N
e
w
 O
rl
e
a
n
s
3
4
T
o
le
d
o
S
a
n
 A
n
to
n
io
3
5
N
a
s
h
v
il
le
3
6
*
 T
h
e
 m
e
tr
o
p
o
li
ta
n
 a
re
a
 h
a
s
 d
a
ta
 r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
 f
o
r 
m
o
re
 t
h
a
n
 o
n
e
 a
ir
p
o
rt
.
The Urban Center, Levin College of Urban Affairs, CSU 32
Figure 6a: The Midwest Region
RH2: St. Louis RH3: Cincinnati
RH3: Pittsburgh
RH2: Detroit
C: Memphis
D: Nashville
C: Louisville
C: Toledo
C: Dayton
C: Indianapolis
I1: Toronto
P: Chicago
Figure 6b  Northeast Ohio Region
Loc: Hopkins
Loc: Akron/Canton
Loc: Burke Lakefront
Loc: County Airport
Loc: Ravenna
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Data for most of the air markets in East Central North America are presented in Table 5.
(Cargo specialists with very low volumes of passenger traffic were omitted.)  The air
markets in this region were then sorted by the population size of each market, which
corresponds to the order of total income in each metropolitan area.  However, the rank
order of passenger volumes within the region do not correspond perfectly with the other
two rank orders.  To improve international air service in Northeast Ohio, and by so doing
improve its competitive position within East North Central North America, requires
increasing passenger volumes.  Some improvement will come with growth in the
continental air passenger market; the rest will have to come from gains in the market
position of service providers in Northeast Ohio relative to competitor airlines who use other
airports.  In the next section a number of issues related to the future of air services in
Northeast Ohio are discussed.
AIR SERVICES ISSUES FACING NORTHEAST OHIO
It appears that between 19 and 20 million passengers per year is a threshold for entering
the next tier of air services and competing fully with the third-tier regional hubs and the
second- and third-tier international gateways.  This target needs to be kept in mind for
future planning of the air services market in Northeast Ohio.  It will take time to reach this
number and it will have to come from traffic generated from hub operations.
Cost
Is a new Denver-style airport, possibly located in Ravenna, the solution to Northeast Ohio’s
air services  challenge?  There are five reasons why the answer is no.
1. The federal government indicated that Denver was the last new airport that will receive
substantial funding; the region and state of Ohio would have to find a way to finance a
new airport largely on its own.  The direct cost of building an airport is huge.  The
approved five-year expansion to Hopkins will cost one-half billion dollars. Denver
International Airport cost nearly $4.2 billion in direct construction cost in 1991, bonding
three-quarters of this amount.  The FAApaid $685 million.
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Table 5: Northeast Ohio’s Competitor Ait Service Markets in East Central North America Sorted by Passenger Volume
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2. The connecting infrastructure, roads, water, and sewers would eat up the region’s
typical share of the state capital budget for a significant period of time, leaving other
projects unfunded.  The fiscal opportunity cost w uld be tremendous.  The economic
feasibility of the project should be judged by balancing the direct construction costs and
the indirect infrastructure costs against the incremental growth in the regional economy
that would not have occurred if a new airport is not built.  The direct costs of the airport
are likely to be between $4 and $5 billion and the indirect infrastructure expenditure
would be equivalent.  To be conservative, assume that the total present value bill for a
new airport would be $8 billion in a metropolitan economy that has a total income of
$72 billion.  Is it likely that a new airport would generate additional  income that is equal
to 10 and 12 percent of total income?  This is extremely doubtful.
3. The experience in Denver indicates that financing a new airport with user fees is not
feasible. If the airlines had to directly pay the lion’s share of the bill, their  operating
costs would increase to the point where they would take all of their operations, except
those required to serve just the local market, elsewhere.
4. The map of airports in the seven counties surrounding Cleveland and Akron  indicates
that placing a major growth pole in the southeastern corner of the region at the
Ravenna Arsenal would significantly distort current growth paths.  Putting the airport at
the edge of the Akron and Cleveland metropolitan areas would have a devastating
impact on land values in other parts of the metropolitan area and feed sprawl.
5. A new airport would generate new economic activity—hotels, housing, and industry—
but it is likely that most of it would have either occurred anyway or it would have moved
from other locations in the regional economy.  If county and municipal politicians are
rational, they should oppose a major new infrastructure project that would hurt their tax
bases and generate demands on state and county revenues that would compete with
investments in their jurisdictions.  Building a new airport would hurt the tax bases of
Cuyahoga, Summit, and Stark Counties and would not be politically viable.
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The solution to expanding the capacity of the air services market in Northeast Ohio lies in
finding a regional answer to capacity constraints by developing coordinated specialized
niches for several of the region’s airports.  The existing capacity of all of the airports in the
region needs to be maximized and then incremental investments should be made that best
improve the competitive position of the regional air system.
The way the air services issue is discussed in Northeast Ohio needs to be changed.  The
question should not be: Cleveland-Hopkins versus a new regional airport.  This is the
wrong question because the region cannot afford a new regional airport financially,
economically, or politically.  This dichotomy presents a false pair of alternatives that leaves
the region worse off no matter which one is selected.  Questions about the adequacy of air
services needs to be reframed.  The two fundamental issues are: How can the region best
use all of its capacity to compete with other metropolitan regions?  How can the region’s air
services be used to deepen our economic development capacity?  In this context the
facilities at Akron-Canton should not be viewed as a competitor to those at Hopkins; they
should be viewed as a complement.
Capacity
Planning for the future of air services in the region must begin with a pragmatic targeted
capacity for the region, a realistic assessment of the peak capacity of each airport under a
number of scenarios, and possible specializations for each airport.  Therefore, a
comprehensive look at the current and possible functions of Cleveland-Hopkins, Akron-
Canton, Burke Lakefront, and Cuyahoga County airports is necessary.  This examination
should cover (1) development strategy, (2) a segment-based marketing plan that reflects
that strategy, (3) physical land uses at each airport and surrounding property, (4) planned
and proposed infrastructure investments that will influence land uses near the airports, and
(5) alternative regional management, finance, governance, and ownership structures that
range from joint marketing agreements to a comprehensive regional airport authority.
However, all of this activity is predicated on a very public examination of the capacity and
possible uses of  each facility.
The model for a solution to the capacity constraints that Cleveland-Hopkins will face in the
near future lies in specialization among the airports as has occurred in the Washington,
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Denver, and San Francisco markets.  Airports in these markets have developed niches that
have strengthened the overall region.  (The specialization of Denver’s airports was not
planned; it was a market-generated response to Denver’s fee structure and United Airlines’
strong market presence in the new Denver airport.)  Each of these air markets has at least
one secondary airport that is distant from the core city of the metropolitan area that
specializes in low-fare airlines.  Washington also has a secondary airport that specializes in
international flights that is linked to a domestic hub—this is mostly due to legislative
restrictions on National Airport.  Oakland’s airport in the San Francisco Bay area appears
to combine a specialization in low-fare airlines with cargo.
Developing a regional strategy for increasing the air services capacity in Northeast Ohio
leads to the following specific questions:
· Can the airlines and airports in Northeast Ohio attract the number of passengers
required to reach the next tier of the air services hierarchy?  This requires the ability to
attract an additional 7.3 to 10.3 million passengers per year.  This is an increase of 72
percent.  Most of these passengers will have to come from airlines that compete with
Continental and use other hub airports in this catchment area.
· Can the airport capacity in the region be configured to accommodate that demand?
· Can the airports in this region be linked through ground transportation to service the
demand?  Alternative considerations for ground transportation should range from
passenger van links to rail links.
· Can Hopkins Airport serve as the primary business airport that services full-fare carriers
and possible international and transcontinental flights?  This would recognize that
Continental would, in all likelihood, be the dominant carrier in that airport.  When open-
skies agreements are fully executed with Europe and Asia, can Northeast Ohio be a
viable base for some of their operations?
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· Can Akron-Canton Regional Airport develop enough business to house one or more
discount carriers, charter airlines, and major carriers who want a base of operations
outside of Continental’s shadow?
· Over the long term, should Burke Lakefront Airport stay in operation?  Will increased
traffic at Hopkins interfere with Burke’s flight operations?  Is Burke’s current business
better suited for either Akron-Canton or a smaller airport, such as the County Airport?
Is the land at Burke better suited for housing and recreation?
Free Times reporter Mark Naymik wrote that the approved runway expansion will allow 50
take-offs and 50 landings per hour in good weather, up from the current 40.30  However,
capacity will only expand to 33 take-offs and 33 landings per hour from the current 30 in
bad weather.  Does this number of take-off and landing slots match the targeted passenger
volume given peak-hour capacity constraints?  In late spring 1997, Hopkins had 600
departures and arrivals daily; this does not account for the additional traffic that will be
generated by Continental’s regional jet expansion.31  Additionally, this activity is not spread
evenly throughout the day, but is concentrated in several traffic peaks.  A definitive answer
cannot be given without a capacity study.  The proposed expansion is necessary, but it is
doubtful that it can meet demands that will be placed on the airport by its current growth
path, and it will not be able to accommodate a major expansion in traffic.
There are a few specific questions that need to be investigated concerning land uses
around Hopkins airport:
· Does Cleveland-Hopkins Airport require runways that can accommodate two airplanes
landing or taking off independently and simultaneously to reach competitive scale on its
own?  If so, how can this be accommodated within the airport’s footprint?
                                           
30 Naymik, Mark, “Tarmac Turbulence,” The Cleveland Free Times, August 13-19, 1997, p.16.
31 Wasserstrom, “Come Fly with Me, Cleveland Magazine, p.6.
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· Should the current airport envelop be expanded, possibly by bridging Route 237 and
Snow Road, and place its maintenance and cargo operations to the east of the current
airport boundary?
· How do current highway, RTA, and railroad plans affect the airport and possible
ancillary developments?
There is nothing in this set of questions that is critical of the current expansion plans at
Hopkins.  These investments are required to maintain the competitive position of the airport
and of the region over the near term.  They are intended to frame the discussion for the
next phase of air services competition in the region.
The Role of Continental Airlines
Continental Airlines is Northeast Ohio’s de facto partner in expanding air services.  The
region’s ability to capture an increased share of growth in North American air travel
depends on Continental’s increasing its national market share.  Therefore, a series of
questions revolve around Continental Airlines, its strategy, and Cleveland’s place in that
strategy.
· Can Continental increase its national market share in the face of the weakness of US
Airways, TWA, and Delta, and funnel a portion of that traffic through Cleveland?
· How many additional passengers is the regional jet expansion expected to produce and
how many take-off and landing slots will they consume during peak hours?  How will
they feed into Continental’s route structure?
· If Newark is Continental’s dominant European gateway and Houston is its gateway to
Central and South America, what is Cleveland’s international potential within
Continental’s corporate strategy?
· Does Canada offer market extensions for Continental from Cleveland—especially with
the introduction of regional jets?
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· Can Continental move Cleveland-Hopkins further along in the international air market
by introducing same-plane one-stop service to Mexico, Central America, and South
America through Houston?  Can Continental support same-plane one-stop service from
Houston to Canadian destinations through Cleveland?   Does Continental’s code-
sharing arrangement with Virgin Atlantic Airlines offer the prospect of same-plane one-
stop service through either Newark or Kennedy, or direct service to the United
Kingdom?
· How many transoceanic international flights does Continental require to staff an
international base in Cleveland?  How will that affect Continental’s New rk operations?
· Finally, can Continental service Asian markets from Cleveland, or should an airline with
a significant presence in a secondary Pacific gateway, such as Seattle, b  courted?
· It should be pointed out that it may be in Continental Airlines’ best interest, but not the
region’s, to have Hopkins reach capacity after the airport is expanded.  If the airport
reaches capacity, Continental could purchase the slots of other carriers, increase its
market share, and once it controls 70 to 75 percent of the market, push up prices.
Other Airlines
The key to the growth in air services in Northeast Ohio is held by Continental.  Yet, the
desirable effects of the expansion in one airline’s market share can be offset by high fares
due to a lack of competition.  When Hopkins starts to reach its capacity, fares will rise and
price-sensitive passengers will begin driving to Columbus, Detroit, and Pittsburgh.
Therefore, Northeast Ohio needs to maintain the interest of other airlines in its facilities.  As
Hopkins reaches its capacity, it is essential that Akron-Canton be developed as an
alternative or else the region will lose not only the price-sensitive leisure traveler but
business travel as well.
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The Challenge
Northeast Ohio cannot afford a new regional airport, yet it also cannot afford to allow
Hopkins to reach its capacity after the new investments are completed.  If that capacity is
reached, fares will increase, the number of destinations will plateau, and the competitive
position of the region will erode compared to Cincinnati, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and possibly
Columbus and Nashville.  Vision and regional leadership are required to intentionally craft
a regional system of air services capacity.
Improving the competitive position of Northeast Ohio in the market for air services
demands leadership because the solution to capacity constraints lies in maximizing existing
capacity and in making incremental investments that improve the competitive position of
Northeast Ohio’s airports.  Airports in several regions have evolved into systems of
airports.  New York did so intentionally using the powers of  the New York Port Authority
from the early days of commercial aviation.  Market forces have evolved a system of
complementary airports in the Denver-Colorado Springs, San Francisco, and Washington-
Baltimore areas.  No region has attempted to intentionally knit together a coordinated
system of airports as a strategy for dealing with capacity constraints at the region’s
dominant airport.  The most difficult parts of this process will be tackling the issues of the
governance and ownership of the facilities.  This is best addressed by determining the
structure that best implements the region’s strategic vision and builds its competitive
advantage. Community leaders in Akron, Canton, and Cleveland need to form a regional
alliance to ensure the competitive position of this vital portion of our economic
infrastructure.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1: North American Airports  Included in Each
Metropolitan Region
Albany Greenville Oklahoma City
Albuquerque Halifax Omaha
Anchorage Hartford Orlando
Atlanta Hilo Palm Beach
Austin Honolulu Philadelphia
Baton Rouge Houston* Intercontinental Phoenix
Birmingham Hobby Pittsburgh
Boise Huntsville Portland
Boston Indianapolis Raleigh-Durham
Buffalo Jacksonville Reading
Calgary Kahului Reno
Charleston Kansas City Richmond
Charlotte Keahole Roanoke
Chicago* O'Hare Knoxville Sacramento* International
Midway Lansing Mather
Megis Las Vegas* McCarran Salt Lake City
Cincinnati North Las Vegas San Antonio
Cleveland* Hopkins Henderson ExecutiveSan Diego
Burke Lihue San Francisco*International
Columbia Los Angeles* International Oakland
Columbus* Port Columbus Long Beach San Jose
Rickenbacker Santa Ana Sarasota
Dallas* Dallas-Fort Worth Santa Barbara Seattle
Love Field Burbank Sioux Falls
Dayton Louisville Spokane
Daytona Memphis St. Louis
DC* National Miami* International St. Petersburg
Dulles Ft. Lauderdale Stewart
BWI Milwaukee Syracuse
Denver* Denver Minneapolis Tampa
Colorado Springs Montreal* Dorval Toledo
Des Moines Mirabel Toronto
Detroit Nashville Tucson
Edmonton New Orleans Tulsa
El Paso New York* Kennedy Vancouver
Fairbanks La Guardia Victoria
Ft. Myers Newark Wichita
Grand Rapids Norfolk
Greensboro
* There are data on more than one airport in this air market.
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Appendix Table 2:  80 Largest North American Air Service Markets in
1996 by Passenger Volume
Rank Metro Region Passengers Rank Metro Region Passengers
1 New York* 80,962,006  41 Albuquerque 6,618,751    
2 Chicago* 79,127,250  42 Raleigh-Durham 6,478,776    
3 Los Angeles* 71,229,828  43 Columbus* 6,275,587    
4 Dallas* 65,099,018  44 Kahului 5,906,135    
5 Atlanta 63,303,171  45 Austin 5,691,233    
6 San Francisco* 58,995,828  46 Palm Beach 5,680,913    
7 Miami-Ft. Lauderdale*44,674,431  47 Milwaukee 5,452,645    
8 Houston* 42,179,263  48 Hartford 5,377,759    
9 DC* 41,302,560  49 Anchorage 4,763,283    
10 Denver* 37,079,485  50 Ft. Myers 4,206,936    
11 Las Vegas* 31,374,749  51 Jacksonville 3,714,010    
12 Detroit 30,610,993  52 El Paso 3,561,072    
13 Phoenix 30,411,852  53 Louisville 3,559,340    
14 Minneapolis 28,771,750  54 Omaha 3,547,895    
15 St. Louis 27,274,846  55 Tucson 3,513,443    
16 Boston 25,167,741  56 Oklahoma City 3,495,805    
17 Honolulu 24,326,737  57 Tulsa 3,387,803    
18 Seattle 24,324,596  58 Spokane 3,258,762    
19 Toronto 24,259,268  59 Edmonton 3,121,444    
20 Orlando 23,587,773  60 Buffalo 2,940,627    
21 Charlotte 21,849,879  61 Norfolk 2,784,108    
22 Salt Lake City 21,088,478  62 Birmingham 2,749,403    
23 Pittsburgh 20,533,660  63 Halifax 2,744,720    
24 Philadelphia 19,317,220  64 Lihue 2,561,807    
25 Cincinnati 18,864,206  65 Keahole 2,524,402    
26 Vancouver 14,201,343  66 Greensboro 2,381,495    
27 San Diego 13,788,725  67 Boise 2,375,289    
28 Tampa 13,001,091  68 Richmond 2,154,603    
29 Portland 12,593,013  69 Albany 2,029,393    
30 Cleveland* 11,582,164 70 Syracuse 2,015,749    
31 Kansas City 10,454,857  71 Dayton 1,977,243    
32 Memphis 9,922,211    72 Des Moines 1,807,990    
33 Montreal* 8,941,883    73 Grand Rapids 1,672,565    
34 New Orleans 8,483,453    74 Hilo 1,622,743    
35 San Antonio 7,135,291    75 Sarasota 1,589,352    
36 Nashville 7,099,103    76 Charleston 1,472,843    
37 Sacramento* 7,090,735    77 Greenville 1,428,223    
38 Indianapolis 7,069,039    78 Wichita 1,427,542    
39 Calgary 6,913,867    79 Knoxville 1,409,100    
40 Reno 6,742,532    80 Columbia 1,159,214    
*  Data are available on more than one airport in this air market.
Source: North American Air Traffic Report, May 1997.
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Appendix Table 3: Top 114 Largest Airports in North America, Ranked
by 1996 Passenger Volumes
Rank Airport Passengers Rank Airport Passengers Rank Airport Passengers
1 Chicago-Ohare 69,153,528  41 Montreal 8,941,883   81 Keahole 2,524,402    
2 Atlanta 63,303,171  42 New Orleans 8,483,453   82 Greensboro 2,381,495    
3 Dallas-Ft.Worth 58,034,503  43 Houston-Downtown (Hobey)8,387,434   83 Boise 2,375,289    
4 Los Angeles International57,974,559  44 LA-Orange County 7,307,750   84 Richmond 2,154,603    
5 San Francisco International39,251,942  45 San Antonio 7,135,291   85 Albany 2,029,393    
6 Miami International 33,504,579  46 Nashville 7,099,103   86 Syracuse 2,015,749    
7 Denver 32,296,174  47 Sacramento 7,090,735   87 Dayton 1,977,243    
8 New York-JFK 31,155,411  48 Indianapolis 7,069,039   88 Des Moines 1,807,990    
9 Detroit 30,610,993  49 Dallas-Love 7,064,515   89 Grand Rapids 1,672,565    
10 Las Vegas 30,459,965  50 Calgary 6,913,867   90 Hilo, HI 1,622,743    
11 Phoenix 30,411,852  51 Reno 6,742,532   91 Sarasota 1,589,352    
12 New York-Newark 29,107,459  52 Albuquerque 6,618,751   92 Charleston 1,472,843    
13 Minneapolis 28,771,750  53 Raleigh-Durham 6,478,776   93 Greenville 1,428,223    
14 St. Louis 27,274,846  54 Montreal 6,376,806   94 Wichita 1,427,542    
15 Houston Int 26,484,079  55 Columbus 6,275,587   95 Knoxville 1,409,100    
16 Boston 25,167,741  56 Ontario 6,252,838   96 Columbia 1,159,214    
17 Honolulu 24,326,737  57 Kahului 5,906,135   97 St. Petersburgh 1,045,928    
18 Seattle 24,324,596  58 Austin 5,691,233   98 Victoria 978,625      
19 Toronto 24,259,268  59 Palm Beach 5,680,913   99 Huntsville 923,827      
20 Orlando 23,587,773  60 Milwaukee 5,452,645   100 Baton Rouge 884,737      
21 Charlotte 21,849,879  61 Hartford 5,377,759   101 Stewart 835,329      
22 Salt Lake City 21,088,478  62 LA-Burbank 4,838,483   102 Fairbanks 831,048      
23 New York-LaGuardia 20,699,136  63 Denver-Colorado Springs 4,783,311   103 Daytona 807,449      
24 Pittsburgh 20,533,660  64 Anchorage 4,763,283   104 Las Vegas-VGT 700,473      
25 Philadelphia 19,317,220  65 Ft. Myers 4,206,936   105 Roanoke 686,952      
26 Cincinnati 18,864,206  66 Jacksonville 3,714,010   106 Lansing 681,803      
27 DC-National 15,095,923  67 El Paso 3,561,072   107 LA-Santa Barbara 673818
28 Vancouver 14,201,343  68 Louisville 3,559,340   108 Sioux Falls 673,582      
29 San Diego 13,788,725  69 Omaha 3,547,895   109 Toledo 600,276      
30 DC-BWI 13,431,922  70 Tucson 3,513,443   110 LA-Long Beach 435,218      
31 Tampa 13,001,091  71 Oklahoma City 3,495,805   111 Las Vegas-HSH 214,311      
32 DC-Dulles 12,774,715  72 Tulsa 3,387,803   112 Chicago-CGX 134,439      
33 Portland 12,593,013  73 Spokane 3,258,762   113 Houston-EFD 94,299        
34 Cleveland 11,582,164 74 Edmonton 3,121,444   114 Reading 89,950        
35 Ft Lauderdale 11,169,852  75 Buffalo 2,940,627   
36 Kansas City 10,454,857  76 Norfolk 2,784,108   
37 SF-San Jose 10,009,027  77 Birmingham 2,749,403   
38 Memphis 9,922,211   78 Halifax 2,744,720   
39 Chicago-Midway 9,839,283   79 Montreal-YMX 2,565,077   
40 SF-Oakland 9,734,859   80 Lihue 2,561,807   
Source: North American Air Traffic Report, May 1997.
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Appendix Table 4: Top 80 North American Air Service Markets in
1996
Rank Metro Region Tons Rank Metro Region Tons
1 New York* 2,681,529    41 Columbia 111,263      
2 Memphis 1,933,846    42 Omaha 103,170      
3 Miami-Ft. Lauderdale* 1,866,437    43 Austin 101,334      
4 Los Angeles* 1,806,785    44 Raleigh-Durham 98,666        
5 San Francisco* 1,418,973    45 San Diego 92,980        
6 Louisville 1,368,520    46 San Antonio 87,335        
7 Chicago* 1,286,962    47 Sacramento* 86,990        
8 Atlanta 800,181      48 Albuquerque 84,316        
9 Dallas* 774,947      49 New Orleans 78,570        
10 Dayton 767,255      50 Greensboro 76,053        
11 Toronto 735,486      51 El Paso 68,275        
12 Indianapolis 609,450      52 Richmond 66,164        
13 DC* 528,579      53 Las Vegas* 56,747        
14 Philadelphia 493,532      54 Buffalo 56,499        
15 Honolulu 436,165      55 Nashville 53,608        
16 Denver* 411,394      56 Tulsa 53,189        
17 Boston 405,582      57 Jacksonville 52,476        
18 Seattle 388,218      58 Oklahoma City 52,440        
19 Minneapolis 361,448      59 Reading 45,608        
20 Toledo 344,976      60 Birmingham 44,877        
21 Houston* 339,100      61 Spokane 44,005        
22 Detroit 326,288      62 Kahului 41,894        
23 Cincinnati 288,823      63 Wichita 39,175        
24 Phoenix 283,665      64 Knoxville 33,949        
25 Portland 265,083      65 Reno 33,565        
26 Salt Lake City 227,913      66 Fairbanks 33,081        
27 Vancouver 216,889      67 Boise 33,044        
28 Orlando 206,755      68 Grand Rapids 32,021        
29 Anchorage 185,119      69 Tucson 29,712        
30 Charlotte 184,070      70 Palm Beach 27,846        
31 Kansas City 163,217      71 Sioux Falls 27,823        
32 Pittsburgh 156,619      72 Huntsville 27,418        
33 Hartford 151,532      73 Norfolk 26,829        
34 Cleveland* 131,600      74 Hilo 26,806        
35 St. Louis 131,436      75 Lansing 25,725        
36 Tampa 123,439      76 Greenville 24,698        
37 Stewart 117,184      77 Syracuse 24,599        
38 Columbus* 113,673      78 Keahole 22,607        
39 Milwaukee 111,844      79 Albany 22,521        
40 Des Moines 111,795      80 Roanoke 21,258        
*  Data are available on more than one airport in this air market.
** Toronto and Vancouver are the only Canadaian markets with reported cargo tonnage.
Source: North American Air Traffic Report, May 1997.
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Appendix Table 5: Top 80 North American Air Service Markets  in
1996 by Take-offs and Landings (Operations)
Rank Metro Region Tons Rank Metro Region Tons
1 Los Angeles* 2,060,491    41 Columbus* 224,904      
2 Chicago* 1,206,791    42 Nashville 211,821      
3 San Francisco* 1,203,599    43 Tulsa 204,824      
4 New York* 1,151,786    44 Albuquerque 204,247      
5 Houston* 1,102,644    45 Milwaukee 200,963      
6 Dallas* 1,070,754    46 Kansas City 197,184      
7 DC* 889,709      47 Palm Beach 196,445      
8 Miami-Ft. Lauderdale* 772,387      48 Kahului 178,590      
9 Atlanta 761,011      49 Boise 178,214      
10 Las Vegas* 754,932      50 Wichita 177,055      
11 Denver* 672,298      51 Louisville 175,286      
12 Detroit 538,424      52 St. Petersburg 175,079      
13 Phoenix 526,648      53 Sacramento* 172,203      
14 St Louis 513,849      54 Lansing 165,344      
15 Minneapolis 485,480      55 Omaha 162,418      
16 Boston 456,226      56 Victoria 159,781      
17 Pittsburgh 451,995      57 Hartford 158,190      
18 Charlotte 446,629      58 Sarasota 158,153      
19 Philadelphia 416,248      59 Birmingham 156,277      
20 Cincinnati 401,367      60 Stewart 156,004      
21 Seattle 395,216      61 Oklahoma City 154,205      
22 Cleveland* 383,717      62 Reno 150,526      
23 Toronto 375,250      63 Dayton 148,679      
24 Salt Lake City 374,209      64 Buffalo 146,695      
25 Honolulu 372,268      65 Baton Rouge 146,451      
26 Memphis 359,416      66 Charleston 146,187      
27 Orlando 341,205      67 New Orleans 145,799      
28 Vancouver 330,364      68 Richmond 140,203      
29 Portland 297,941      69 Norfolk 139,980      
30 Austin 292,642      70 Grand Rapids 139,533      
31 Daytona 272,572      71 Halifax 139,193      
32 Tampa 268,013      72 Reading 138,451      
33 San Antonio 262,468      73 Jacksonville 138,111      
34 Montreal* 256,160      74 Syracuse 136,858      
35 Tucson 241,118      75 Des Moines 134,841      
36 Anchorage 240,661      76 El Paso 134,601      
37 Calgary 235,170      77 Albany 133,115      
38 Raleigh-Durham 233,820      78 Knoxville 132,041      
39 Indianaplolis 227,109      79 Greensboro 131,227      
40 San Diego 226,063      80 Spokane 113,131      
*  Data are available on more than one airport in this air market.
Source: North American Air Traffic Report, May 1997.
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